

2019 CTC-Gregg Centre Conference

Abstracts

Keynote Speaker – LGen Michael Rouleau, Comd CJOC
The Conduct of Operations in Grey Zone Era:

The return of “Great Power Competition” has thrust the CAF into a state of constant conflict, wherein the combined outcomes of several different operations across all domains and all regions of the world influence which strategic interest gains the advantage in terms of military, economic, political and technological influence. In this context, the CAF must be able to execute numerous, diverse and increasingly challenging operations – mostly below the threshold of armed conflict – and to coordinate them for coherent strategic effect. This dynamic requires the CAF to distribute tactical decision-making authorities to the lowest possible level, and foster higher headquarters that are capable of thinking strategically, rapidly internalizing lessons learned, engaging civilian partners effectively and planning for the future.

Panel 1: Historical Context and Personal Experiences

COL Klug
Guadalcanal: The First US Offensive in the Pacific

No abstract given.

Dr. Lee Windsor
Pachino to Ortona: Learning from Canada's First Chapter in the European Theatre, 1943.

This paper explores the first six-month period of sustained land warfare for the Canadian Army in the Second World War. The experience, adaptation, innovation, and enemy responses during those dramatic and rapidly evolving months profoundly influenced how the Canadian Army understood and fought the rest of the campaign, if not the whole war.

Maj Charles Chuter
British Army Full-Spectrum Experience in Iraq

No abstract given.

Panel 2: Eastern Europe

Dr. Tracey German, King's College London
The Changing Character of Conflict: views from Russia

This paper explores Russian views of the changing character of conflict and what future wars may look like. There is a rich tradition of debate on military strategic issues and a lot of

attention has been paid to the impact of developments at home and abroad on military strategy: the political and economic upheaval caused by the dissolution of the USSR, Western interventions in places such as Serbia, Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, as well as Russia's own military experiences such 1991. Over the past decade there has been consistent number of articles and papers published in open sources focused on the characteristics of 21st century conflict and the threats facing Russia. A particular focus has been the role of soft power and non-military means of destabilisation, such as 'controlled chaos' and the threat from 'coloured revolutions'. This paper explores these trends in Russian strategic thought and outlines the implications of Russian conclusions regarding the characteristics of contemporary and future conflict for the West.

*LCol Sean French, CO 2 RCR
Operation Reassurance in Latvia*

As a result of Russia's annexation of Crimea and destabilization of eastern Ukraine, the decision was made at the NATO Warsaw Summit in 2016 to form four enhanced Forward Presence Battle Groups (eFP BG) along NATO's eastern flank in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. eFP BG Latvia is Canadian led and composed of soldiers from eight other NATO nations. With the BG fully integrated into the Latvian Mechanized Infantry Brigade and the NATO chain of command we have changed Russia's strategic calculation and are demonstrating NATO's resolve.

Building such a multinational BG is not without challenges. A deliberate, systematic, and balanced approach with consistency across rotations and close integration with our Latvian hosts is vital to learning and improving the BG's effectiveness. As this mission evolves it remains key to increase interoperability while ensuring readiness, force protection, and a positive presence in Latvia and at home. Empowering others and relationships are crucial building blocks along with unconditional commitment of great people from all nations to making the eFP Battle Group Latvia work and continuing to make it better.

*Maj Mark Smith
Indirect & Direct Approaches to Mentoring, Training and Providing Advice and Assistance to Ukrainian Security Forces. Reflections as Officer Commanding Line of Effort 1, Operation UNIFIER Rotation 5*

Operation UNIFIER Rotation 5 occurred from March to September 2018 in various locations throughout Ukraine. Within Operation UNIFIER, Line of Effort 1 (LOE 1) was the largest, most geographically dispersed sub unit and was responsible to provide mentoring, training, advice and assistance to a number of personnel and organizations of the Security Forces of Ukraine (SFU). LOE 1 personnel were required to use indirect approaches and direct approaches when working with the SFU which created both opportunities and challenges for LOE 1 members.

Panel 3: Future Security / Operating Environment

Mr. Peter Archambault, DRDC/CFD

Future Security Environment or Future Operating Environment: I Can't See the Difference, Can You See the Difference? A Canadian Perspective

Military joint-level analysis enables strategic dialogue on military affairs between the military-strategic and political-strategic levels. In contrast to what was often stated to be a complex and ambiguous international security environment, the dialogue in recent years and months has been driven much more by discussions of threats and risks to international stability. This paper examines the shift in joint military planning assessments from *security* to *operating* environment constructs that has emerged gradually over the last decade. While touching on *why* and *how* this shift has occurred, the paper will focus on the way it has affected analytical focus and, more broadly, the craft of military planning. In so doing, it proposes that the fundamental distinction between Future Security Environment (FSE) and Future Operating Environment (FOE) analysis is intellectual: it entails a different way of thinking about the future. This paper also provides an explanation of how joint considerations centered on unifying CAF capabilities differs from other levels of analysis.

Many aspects of security environment analysis can be unconstrained, generic and, at times, of marginal value to military planners who have to link thinking about the future to policy, resources, and procurement of capabilities. The exigencies of the operating environment, however, demand a conceptually realistic focus on military opportunities and challenges. Realizing this necessary focus, the analytical requirement for an intellectual space grounded in evidence becomes clear. This bounds thinking at the joint level with consideration of potential real or "composite" adversaries, their strategies, characteristics, and the many implications that can be derived from analyzing Red/Blue interaction. Put simply, it places a premium on the professional discipline necessary to support and conduct the analysis required to conceive of joint force development choices to be made and the consequences that may result.

Dr. David Hofmann

Targeted Removal: Optimizing Disruption to Illicit and Covert Networks

No abstract given.

Panel 4: Canadian Army Structure

LGen Mike Day (Ret'd)

What Capabilities and Supporting Structures do we need to remain Relevant?

No abstract given.

Panel 5: New Trends in Warfare

*BGen Jayne, DG Cyber
New Trends in Warfare*

The topic of Cyber Warfare is a vast one which has gained a great deal of attention as the future battlespace. It is, however, not the future battlespace, but the present one. Nations are using this environment to conduct active cyber operations as an integral part of their strategic campaign plans. The Canadian Armed Forces has realized that in order to operate in this environment, one has to understand it, appreciate current and future threats, and incorporate it into our operations as well as own whole of government strategic messaging. The Cyberspace Division is responsible for the comprehensive, integrated and adaptive cyber forces that ensure DND/CAF freedom of action in the cyber domain, while denying the same to our adversaries.

*Dr. George Lucas, US Naval Academy
Beyond Clausewitz: rethinking military strategy for alt-war*

No abstract given.

*Dr. Noel Anderson, University of Toronto
Competitive Intervention, Protracted Conflict, and the Global Prevalence of Civil War*

This article develops a theory of competitive intervention in civil war to explain variation in the global prevalence of intrastate conflict. I describe the distortionary effects competitive interventions have on domestic bargaining processes and explain the unique strategic dilemmas they entail for third-party interveners. The theory uncovers the conditional nature of intervention under the shadow of inadvertent escalation and moves beyond popular anecdotes about “proxy wars” by deriving theoretically-grounded propositions about the strategic logics motivating intervener behaviors. I then link temporal variation in patterns of competitive intervention to recent decreases in the prevalence and average duration of internal conflicts. The theory is tested with a quantitative analysis of all civil wars fought between 1975 and 2009 and a qualitative case study of the Angolan civil war (1975-1991). My results underscore the importance of a generalizable account of competitive intervention that not only explains past conflicts, but also informs contemporary policy.

Panel 6

*LGen Steven Bowes, Senior Adviser to Director Veterans Affairs
Reflections on Recent CAF Operations and Implications for the Future*

Institutions like militaries are built over decades. It has taken long lead times to significantly change capabilities and structures, and most importantly, organizational culture. Nonetheless, capability development and cultural evolution have foreign and domestic catalysts that must be recognized and exploited.

The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) has been built through the post-World War II period along lines determined by capabilities needed for the Cold War mission set. The Canadian Army was

built to fight alongside and integrate with larger Allied Armies. Requirements for recent major missions like Afghanistan and counter-terrorism were developed on an ad hoc basis, and only institutionalized by rare exception.

Western militaries and certainly the CAF and the Canadian Army have responded slowly to the changing nature of conflict. Adversaries have studied western military conventional capabilities and doctrine. Recent mission initiation and experience amply demonstrates critical capability deficiencies which must be addressed to maintain viable and strategically relevant military capabilities.

Panel 7: Operating in Asia and Africa

Dr. Alistair Edgar, Wilfred Laurier University
UN Peacekeeping with 'Chinese Characteristics'?

Canada is experiencing China's aggressive assertion of its power, but Beijing's willingness to push political, military, economic and diplomatic boundaries in pursuit of its strategic interests already is clear in other parts of the world, such as the South China Sea and Africa, and in its relations with other states such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. At the United Nations, China now is the largest Troop Contributing Country (TCC) among the P-5 members of the Security Council, and has become the second-largest contributor to the UN budget. It recently (unsuccessfully) sought the leadership of the UN Department of Political Affairs, or the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. How might this 'new China' seek to reshape UN peacekeeping missions and mandates, and what would that mean for other TCCs including Canada?

Dr. Jennifer Lofkrantz, American University in Nigeria
"It Was Either You or Boko Haram": Local Responses to the Crisis in Yola, Nigeria

According to the 2017 Global Terrorism Index report, Boko Haram has killed more than 20 000 people and displaced 2.6 million people in Nigeria between 2009 and the end of 2016, making it the deadliest terrorist organization of the twenty-first century.¹ Most research has been focused on Boko Haram's ideology, development, motives, and tactics and on government responses to the insurgency. What has not been well-researched is how local people in north-eastern Nigeria have responded to the crisis caused by this Salafi Jihadist group. Even though it was never occupied by Boko Haram, Yola, the capital of Adamawa State, felt the impacts of the insurgency as well as the stress of being a Boko Haram target for attack and occupation. At one point Boko Haram occupied villages only two hours away from the city. Moreover, during the height of the crisis, the IDP population doubled the size of greater Yola's pre-crisis population of approximately 370 000. Based primarily on oral interviews with local residents - indigenes, settlers, expats, hunters, vigilantes, and religious and community leaders, this paper is focused on local responses to Boko Haram in Yola especially during the height of the crisis in 2014-2015. As a city with a diverse population from across Adamawa State and Nigeria and a significant international community, Yola residents, untrusting of the government's ability to defend the city, drew upon various self-help traditions to respond to the need to protect the city from a Boko Haram invasion; to

¹ *Global Terrorism Index 2017*, (New York: Institute for Economics and Peace, 2017) 74.

provide humanitarian relief to IDPs; and to establish programs to lower Boko Haram's recruitment of local youth.

BGen Saleem Ahmad Khan, Bangladesh Army

"Civil-Military Coordination in UN Peace Operations in Sudan"

No abstract given.

Panel 8: Current Policies & Doctrine

MGen Stephen Cadden, Comd CADTC

Implications for the Canadian Army

No abstract given.