The following are the most recent publications of the Gregg Centre, its staff, and associates.
Canadian Arctic Operations, 1941-2015:
Lessons Learned, Lost, and Relearned
Edited by Adam Lajeunesse and P. Whitney Lackenbauer
The Arctic is back on the Canadian radar. Political, commercial, and strategic interests abound in a region being transformed by climate change, the prospect of expanding resource development, and other global forces. Melting ice and increasing accessibility bring new safety and security demands to which the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) must be ready to respond.
Over the past decade, the CAF have invested significant resources into a concerted program to develop new Arctic capabilities through widely-publicized annual “N-Series” operations (Nanook, Nunalivut, and Nunakput) and a myriad of smaller exercises. As this book reveals, many of the recent operational and tactical ‘lessons learned’ are actually being ‘re-learned’ from previous surges of Northern activity, stretching back over eight decades and encompassing land, sea, and air activities. The chapters in this important book provide an unprecedented overview of operational challenges that the CAF have faced over time, examine how they were addressed, and chart the military’s learning (and forgetting) processes since the Second World War.
By bringing together academic and military experts, Canadian Arctic Operations, 1941-2015: Lessons Learned, Lost, and Relearned provides valuable insights into how the Canadian Army, Royal Canadian Navy, and Royal Canadian Air Force can operate safely and effectively in the Far North. The knowledge and experience needed to do so are not easily gained and, as the chapters in this volume demonstrate, are easily lost if not practiced or exercised regularly. By disseminating lessons learned from Arctic operations, this book helps to consolidate the institutional knowledge that the Canadian military has amassed over time, thus supporting efforts to enhance the mobility, reach, and footprint of the CAF to support operations and to project force into the Arctic.
This publication is available exclusively from the Gregg Centre's webpage.
Edited by Cheryl A. Fury
Traditionally, the history of English maritime adventures has focused on the great sea captains and swashbuckler. However, over the past few decades, social historians have begun to examine the less well-known seafarers who were on the dangerous voyages of commerce, exploration, privateering and piracy, as well as naval campaigns.
This book brings together some of their findings. There is no comparable work that provides such an overview of our knowledge of English seaman during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and the tumultuous world in which they lived.
Subjects covered include trade, piracy, wives, widows, and the wider maritime community, health and medicine at sea, religion and shipboard culture, how Tudor and Stuart ships were manned and provisioned, and what has been learned from the important wreck of the Mary Rose.
Contributors: JD Alsop, John Appleby, Cheryl A. Fury, Geoffrey Hudson, David Loades, Vincent Patarino Jr., Ann Stirland.
Advance and Destroy: Patton as Commander in the Bulge
(Available from University of Kentucky Press, 25 September 2011)
By John Nelson Rickard
The Ardennes was not where Lieutenant General George S. Patton, Jr. wanted to fight in December 1944. With the campaign in Lorraine coming to a close he prepared to smash his way through the West Wall into the Saar industrial region. Hitler's winter counteroffensive led to a radical ninety degree redeployment of Patton's Third Army into southern Luxembourg and Belgium. The Battle of the Bulge, one of the last major German offensives of the war, failed for a variety of reasons, but many historians assert that Patton's intervention was ultimately responsible for securing Allied victory.
Advance and Destroy is the first rigorous analysis of Patton's generalship during the entire Ardennes campaign. Using the "estimate of the situation," the US Army's doctrinal approach to problem-solving, Rickard analyses Patton's day-by-day situational understanding as revealed through ULTRA intelligence. Several of Patton's key G-2 work maps are carefully recreated. The oversight of Eisenhower and Bradley is closely traced, and Patton's freedom to practice 'operational art' is assessed. Key planning factors such as terrain corridors, weather, air power, force ratios, enemy reserves and threat assessments are fully explained. A greater appreciation for Patton's command and operational techniques is achieved by exploring the perspectives and anxieties of his corps and division commanders as the campaign progressed. This new study is an in-depth, critical analysis of Patton's overall effectiveness in the Bulge, relative to his principal German opponents, Hasso von Manteuffel and Erich Brandenberger, measured in terms of mission accomplishment, his ability to gain and hold ground, and casualties sustained.
In the years since World War II, Patton has assumed a larger-than-life reputation for his leadership, and he has been the star of numerous factual and fictional accounts. Unfortunately, Patton scholarship in the Bulge has done little to investigate his effectiveness beyond the relief of Bastogne. John Nelson Rickard reveals the multiple influences on Patton's operational planning and his willingness to accept considerable risk once all available intelligence had been assessed. The result of this new treatment of Patton is a compelling 'command' portrait of one of America's most brilliant leaders in action, rated by Eisenhower as number one among his army commanders in January 1945 and the one army commander considered to be indispensable to the war effort. Advance and Destroy: Patton as Commander in the Bulge will surely raise the bar in the writing of operational history.
John Nelson Rickard is a captain in the Canadian Armed Forces and is a proud member of Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians) Armored Regiment. He has a Ph.D in military history from the University of New Brunswick. He currently serves in the Directorate of Army Training in Ontario, Canada, and is the author of Patton at Bay: The Lorraine Campaign, 1944.
The Politics of Command: Lieutenant-General A.G.L. McNaughton and the Canadian Army, 1939-1943
(Available from University of Toronto Press, January 2010)
By John Nelson Rickard
General AGL "Andy" McNaughton remains one of Canada's most controversial military figures. A brilliant gunner in the Great War, scientist of extraordinary skill, and founding President of the National Research Council of Canada, his command of the Canadian army in Britain during the early years of the Second World War has been dismissed by historians as largely a failure. McNaughton, we are told, could not handle the tempo of modern war, his grip on operations was weak and he tended to tinker with technology when he should have been driving his formations harder - and better. Moreover, his reluctance to break-up the army in order that some of its formations could be employed in the Mediterranean theatre delayed the entry of the Canadian into sustained combat operations.
John Nelson Rickard's new book, The Policy of Command, refutes all these arguments. Based on his superb UNB PhD dissertation of 2006, Rickard's book reveals a more complex and nuanced McNaughton, one who did well as a Corps and Army commander during exercise in Britain in 1942-43, and one who sought - repeatedly - to get parts of his command into action. The real reasons for McNaughton's dismissal in 1943 had more to do with personalities and politics than his ability to command. Much loved by his men, Rickard leaves us all wondering what might have happened had Andy taken command of First Canadian Army in the field in 1944 rather than the dour and colourless Harry Crerar.
Canada's Navy: The First Century
(Available from University of Toronto Press, January 2010)
By Marc Milner
The instant it appeared in 1999, Canada's Navy became the standard history of Canada's second oldest service. Milner's account takes the story from the navy's inception in the early 20th century as an answer to the pressing need for a naval service to support the interests of the new Dominion of Canada, to deployments around the world a century later as part of Canada's active foreign policy in support of UN and multinational initiatives. A central theme of the book is the constant struggle the navy faced to find a role that Canadians and their government - both largely well removed from the sea and maritime issues -- would support. The second edition updates that story, adding a new lengthy chapter outlining the navy's operations and problems since the end of the First Gulf War in 1991. It also adds a new epilogue that wrestles with the vexed issue of the relationship between the navy and nation, and how that relationship has played out over the first century of the navy's history.
Kandahar Tour: The Turning Point in Canada's Afghan Mission
By Lee Windsor, David Charters, and Brent Wilson.
In 2006 the Gregg Centre embarked on a major research project on Canada's military, aid and development mission in Afghanistan. The findings were published in September 2008 as Kandahar Tour: The Turning Point in Canada's Afghan Mission. Kandahar Tour brings balance to the public view by telling a full story of one six-month rotation of Canadian soldiers, Mounties, diplomats, aid officials, and UN workers who struggled to bring law, order and aid to Afghanistan in the first half of 2007.